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Daniel Hourigan* 
In many a romantic vision of the state dominating the 
aggressive nature of human beings, the yolk of anarchy stirs. 
But in our postmodern era, such a vision commits itself to a 
fundamental legal-epistemological dilemma: once you know the 
law, you cannot go back to a ʻno lawʼ space. This has led some 
theorists to follow Robert Nozick in seeking the meagre 
assurances of private property and open markets to regulate in 
the absence of a state apparatus that is too conflict-ridden, too 
corrupt to be remedied. However, it is the view of this 
discussion that such a theoretical purview misses several 
crucial features of the psyche of the contemporary Australian 
law revealed by Lacanian psychoanalysis. The purpose of this 
discussion is to draw on the recent High Court of Australia 
appeal Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 
242 CLR 573 and related materials to the end of proposing a 
commentary on a philosophico-psychoanalytic theory of lawʼs 
relation to anarchy. 
The spectre of anarchy as crisis or boon is a properly structural phenomenon 
of modern legal systems. And in the contemporary Australian legal context, 
anarchy has a hidden place in the efforts of the High Court to effect 
legislative harmony.1 The discussion in this article proposes a speculative 
critique of law to the end of unearthing a philosophico-psychoanalytic theory 
of the dialectic of law and anarchy. 
The discussion opens with a brief outline of the contemporary framing of 
anarchy in current scholarship before moving to an elaboration of the key 
concepts of Lacanian psychoanalytic methodology that will be applied in the 
further analysis. The analysis proper begins with an overview of statutory 
interpretation in an Australian legal context to lay the groundwork for the 
subsequent discussion of the recent case of Lacey v Attorney-General of 
Queensland.2 Lacey will then be examined at length to the end of unearthing 
the rich analytic material to be critiqued subsequently through analytic 
interrogation, interruption and elaboration. The final substantive section then 
takes the reader through a dialectical reappraisal of the law and anarchy in 
light of the conclusions drawn from the discussion of Lacey as an example of 
postmodern jurisprudence. Finally, the conclusion draws together the threads 
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of discussion with an elaboration of the juridico-epistemological problem for 
thinking anarchy today in the postmodern Australian legal context. 
Traditionally, views on the law and anarchy are split across the general 
political spectrum from right to left and back again. To the right we find 
thinkers such as Robert Nozick proposing a type of private property 
anarchism where property is stripped of government regulation and becomes 
its own mechanism of social and legal validation. To enforce such a rule of 
property, one needs a private force at one’s disposal. Such a mercenary 
attitude to law enforcement seems contrary to the utopic liberalism that is the 
thrust of Nozick’s arguments.3 Yet, logically played out, this libertarian 
scenario commits itself to a collapse of jurisdiction and provisional power. 
Coincidentally, such a collapse of jurisdiction and power was a feature of the 
decision of the majority in Lacey. As will be discussed, Lacey presents some 
interesting problems for such a libertarian position that treats the literal law 
as what is to be enforced. 
The views of the libertarian right can be juxtaposed to the arguments 
for a return to the commons by the new left. Following Hardt and Negri’s 
Empire (2001) and Multitude (2005), and works by other Italian political 
philosophers such as Roberto Esposito and to a lesser extent Giorgio 
Agamben, this return to the commons portents to provide a new socio-legal 
link on the basis of shared power in the space of a common municipality or 
new communism.4 Where the libertarian vision collapses jurisdiction and 
power by confusing the form of property as its substantial content, the new 
left’s new communism repeats and reinvents the very political apparatus that 
it critiques. In the new commons, we do not escape law; rather, law once 
again becomes a fiction of the shared social world: in no one person do we 
find the seat of law’s power, but projected as a totality together, in their 
being-with-one-another-in-common, the subjects of the commons function 
as if the law-in-common exists.5 In critical terms, the new left’s vision of a 
new communism of the commons highlights an all too familiar deadlock 
between the shared common experience and the difference between this 
experience and the subjective perspective upon the rule of law that insists on 
such egalitarian sharing, rendering the latter a legal fiction that legitimates 
social order.6 Such fictions are today the hallmark of any society claiming 
legal authority, and how a population behaves in accordance with the law or 
not is perhaps a sign of the psychic problem of believing in or distancing 
oneself from these fictions.7 
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What neither the libertarian view nor the new left vision provides, 
however, is a method to analyse the garden of manias, fantasies and other 
structural psychic phenomena created by the psycho-social relation founding 
both property and the commons. This is not to propose yet another 
psychology of the law. Rather, the critical point here is to examine how 
anarchy is a phenomenon of the structure of the law as an aberration, an 
artificial but nonetheless objective order. To engage this maddening terrain 
of the law and anarchy, we shall now turn to psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalysis – particularly of the post-Freudian or Lacanian variety – 
is becoming a more common sight in the contemporary study of law and 
culture, legal history and legal theory. Unlike philosophies of law, 
psychoanalysis resists inventing a grand metaphysical totality that secures 
law’s conservatism.8 Instead, psychoanalysis is a technique for reading, 
analysing and interrupting the all too smooth and arbitrary operation of the 
law.9 Because of its fascination with the order of the signifier, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is particularly pertinent to this discussion.10 
According to Jacques Lacan, the fundamental point about any law – 
whether civil or common, express or construed – is that it is composed of 
signifiers.11 At its base, the law is a signifier. But what does this mean? Here it 
is instructive to recall that Lacan’s return to the work of Sigmund Freud 
heralded not only a reinvigoration of psychoanalysis but also a response to 
deconstruction and what the Anglophony dubbed ‘post-structuralism’, a vague 
amalgam of many different continental European schools of thought from the 
1960s to the 1990s that includes, among others, the work of Roland Barthes 
(semiotics), Jean-François Lyotard (aesthetic postmodernism), Gilles Deleuze 
(immanent postmodernism), Jacques Derrida (deconstruction), Edward Said 
(postcolonial studies), Michel Foucault (historical genealogy) and Julia 
Kristeva (semiotics and psychoanalysis).12 
This philological point is significant because it provides a context for 
the way Lacan emphasises the signifier as shifting, fragmented, metaphoric, 
metonymic and chained. For Lacan, signifiers exist in a chain of 
signification wherein a given signifier refers to the other signifiers in the 
chain to generate its meaning.13 This network of signification, or ‘symbolic 
order’, operates through endless differentiation.14 In this space, a name or 
symbolic title is alienated through the misrecognition of the symbolic order: 
it never says what something is, only what it is not. What is meaningful is 
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thus always shifting, always a point of difference, always portended by the 
signifier but never equivalent to the signifier.15 
This symbolic game of difference signifies the meaning of a signifier. 
For example, the context of other signifiers generates signified meaning 
through difference – for example, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc – but as this symbolic 
context does not exist in a particular signifier, it must always be inferred ‘as 
if’ it is present through association. For this game of difference to succeed, 
the subject of language must submit to a symbolic belief in metaphor 
whereupon something is something else: Signifier1 is Signifier2.16 For 
example, the law is just, the act is illegal, the sky is blue and so on; what 
makes the meaning coherent is the logic of symbolic differences as each 
signifier is associated with another. The belief in these symbolic fictions 
infers a ‘body of meaning’ or symbolic Other to whom these beliefs are 
addressed in language.17 The grammar of signifiers thus rests not in the 
subject’s consensual hallucination, but in the submission to a symbolic order 
that counters subjective needs with symbolic demands.18 Signification is thus 
not a matter of wild fantasising or solipsistic reasoning, but instead a 
negotiated interplay with a shared field of meanings that is always ‘other’ 
than the subject enunciating a language. 
From the Lacanian position, the subject is in some relation to that which 
is meaningful or desirable.19 Such desire is symbolic rather than a natural 
basis of the human animal. The Other of this symbolic order thus appears to 
‘know’ what the subject wants, irrespective of what the subject intends. This 
has its echo in the trial process, where the sentencing judge signifies the 
meaning of the charges brought before the court in the sentence. The judge 
functions as not only an audience that hears the charges but also as an arbiter 
or Other who brings the charges into a new symbolic arrangement and 
fundamentally alters their meaning by associating them with a sentence, 
another signifier, that refers back to the ‘symbolic content’ of the charges to 
manifest a decision in a juridico-legal context. The judge is dehumanised 
through their symbolic place in the court as the arbiter who decides what the 
charges-qua-signifiers mean and where this decision is believed to be what it 
is by the legal profession and broader community. The important point is 
that without this game of symbolic fictions – that is, if the judge simply 
espoused random decisions that did not inhere to the contextual rules of legal 
context – the judge would be unbelievable; law would be unbelievable.20 
Hence the letters of the law, its messages composed of signifiers, ‘always’ 
arrive at their destination – their legal sense.21 If they do not, then the 
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symbolic misrecognition fails and the court ceases to retain its juridico-legal 
meaning as accepted by those who are subject to, for and by the court.22 Yet 
is this collapse of symbolic misrecognition an avenue to think anarchy in 
psychoanalytic terms? Or, to rephrase, can the subject desire anarchy? 
To answer this question, we must turn to the delimiting question of 
desire: ‘What do you want?’ (Che vuoi?). The form of this question iterates 
upon the metaphoric structure of meaning wherein sign1 is sign2. But to 
whom is ‘Che vuoi?’ addressed? It is to the big Other of the symbolic order, 
a symbolic apparition of the order of differences between signifiers who 
proffers commands and prohibitions? In the symbolic form of the signifier, 
such questions of desire take aim at the Other’s satisfaction to the extent that 
they are reliant upon the belief in the symbolic order and what it renders 
meaningful.23 
Because the order of the symbolic is one of difference, all further 
differences offered in reply to ‘Che vuoi?’ amount to the same symbolic lack 
touched upon by the question of desire. The Other’s answer is thus restricted 
to the identical inverse form of the subject’s own question of desire, ‘What 
do you want?’24 This point is a further renovation of the concept that for a 
signifier or part of law to become meaningful, it must draw the subject into a 
symbolic space that then reflects meaning – vis-à-vis the subject’s message – 
back to the subject.25 Yet the meaningfulness of this reply requires a minimal 
difference be established between the subject and the Other. The repetition 
of the question’s symbolic form suggests that the question of desire must rest 
on something extra, beyond the substantial content of the message. 
This something extra in the question of desire (objet petit a) can be 
observed in the basic question that underlies discussions of law and anarchy: 
addressing the law, the subject asks ‘Do you want anarchy?’ and the law 
responds, ‘Do you want anarchy?’ The minimal difference here flags the 
fantasy coordinates that are involved and yet are not part of the empirical 
symbolic content of the message. Reading the question positively, the 
question of anarchy propounds the overthrow of law, as though in its reply 
the law flays itself, sunders its own condition by tempting the subject with 
its dissolution. In the negative, the question of anarchy is much more 
orthodox and familiar: the subject admonishes the law and the law tyrannises 
the subject’s questioning. Both thinly fantastic readings demonstrate how a 
simple adjustment in the fantasmatic coordinates of the message drastically 
alters the status of law as such and always imputes an intention to it.26 
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A further point here is that, to unreflective reasoning, the equating of 
law with anarchy is impossible or ‘mad’ unless one is willing to suggest a 
pre-legal space by retroactively establishing a minimal difference between 
the legal order of today and a past to which we only have fantasmatic 
access.27 The view that repealing legal order invites anarchy establishes the 
fiction that anarchy is always lying in wait. More strongly, if repealing the 
law is said to lead us to back to a non-legal space, we again commit to a 
fiction that we can somehow escape the law’s conditioning of our view of 
‘not law’.28 The Lacanian formula for the arrival of the letter in its inverted 
form thus demonstrates the always-already symbolic nature of anarchy if it 
is taken in a non-legal sense – that is, anarchy is always part of the law. 
This symbolic interplay of anarchy’s meaningfulness recently 
manifested in the Australian legal context with the appeal case of Lacey v 
Attorney-General of Queensland.29 In this appeal, the High Court of 
Australia repealed a decision by the Queensland Court of Appeal that 
decided that the provision in section 669A(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld), 
which allowed the Attorney-General to appeal sentences, provided some 
general power to vary sentences simply because the Attorney-General chose 
to appeal. Both the decision of the majority French CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J, 
Crennan J, Kiefel J and Bell J and the dissenting opinion of Heydon J focus 
on the interpretation of section 669A(1), but do so in divergent ways that 
elaborate differing operations of belief in the law and the place of anarchy in 
legislative harmony. 
Lacey provided the High Court with an opportunity to once again 
observe the presumptions of statutory interpretation in the Australian legal 
context.30 Moreover, the interpretation of statute functioned to maintain a 
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symbolic economy of the law. The presumptions that structure statutory 
interpretation provide a set of fantasmatic coordinates through which statutes 
can be interpreted desirably in light of the matter before the court. They also 
form an unwritten code that quilts together the fragments of discretionary 
power of construction in matters of statutory interpretation, as exercised by 
the High Court of Australia in particular. These presumptions are 
fantasmatic in the psychoanalytic sense that they make the law believable 
and simultaneously coordinate the desire of the legal subjects recognised by 
the court’s symbolic regime – that is, the judges, council, appellant and so 
on. Without these presumptions, statutory interpretation would appear to 
lack the necessary distance from the wild fantasising of judges’ subjectivity 
and create a psychotic order that is without law.31 Yet, as we shall see, there 
is a particular type of psychoanalytic construction that fits well with the 
purposive construal of statutes now favoured by the High Court.  
While these presumptions may provide the fantasmatic background for 
statutory interpretation, the process of interpretation itself has undergone 
notable shifts across legal history. In the modern Australian legal context, 
what are known as the literal and purposive approaches stand as different 
polarities across the spectrum of judicial interpretation and decision-making. 
Put simply, the literal rule emphasises the meaning of the words used in 
legislation and may only vary its course to avoid absurdity, a tactic 
elsewhere phrased as the golden rule of statutory interpretation.32 On the 
other hand, the purposive rule looks to the context of the legislation and the 
mischief that the legislation is intended to remedy.33 However, while the 
purposive rule can only expand its domain in the absence of clear and 
precise wording in the Acts of Parliament, the literal rule treats all law as 
expressly meaningful and unambiguous although capable of absurdity. For a 
literal repose, such absurdities are not the fault of law but of the shifting 
social context in which the ‘true’ law finds itself. While the literal rule was 
the traditional method used to interpret statutes, today the purposive rule is 
de rigueur and has express mention in section 15AA of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), for 
example, and – more pertinently to our discussion – in the majority decision 
in Lacey. 
At a glance, anarchy seems far from the presumptions and interpretative 
methods of the law. But even a mild questioning of why these presumptions can 
operate to provide the law with some measure of coherency reveals the 
orderlessness of a certain type of fantasmatic anarchy lying in wait, and hints at 
the forced choice to view anarchy as being outside the order of law when it is 
                                                                                                                              
These presumptions are not hard law but their importance should not be underestimated. 
As highlighted by the psychoanalytic approach, it is the fantasmatic status of these 
presumptions that grants the interpretation of legislation some measure of coherency by 
giving them a fantasmatic frame the coordinates the desire for law to ‘happen’. 
31  Lacan (1993), pp 53–56. 
32  Adler v George (1964) 2 QB 7. 
33  Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. 
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given this purposive coherency. What the orderlessness of such anarchy 
indicates is not only an absence of order but also an absence of legal purpose.34 
It is this loss of purpose that so threatens law with the decay of its 
fantasmatically sustained reality. The path to anarchy in this theoretical 
problem is through subjecting law to a premodern legal science that seeks 
the rational truth of law as the only valid criteria of judicial decision-making. 
This truth is rejected for its irrational and arbitrary enforcement, and thus we 
arrive at what the definition thinks as anarchy per se. However, such a legal 
science overlooks that when the fantasmatic coordinates of the law are 
suspended, the reality of law is suspended as well. The result is not the truth 
of law but rather nothing at all – ‘no law’ rather than ‘not law’. 
The fantasmatic content of the law grants legal context/symbolic sense 
to Lacey. But further than this, such legal fictions prompt the question of 
where to position the possibility for anarchy in the frame of a desire for law. 
The majority’s decision in Lacey shows a concern with different forms of 
legal anarchy that may ensue from the appeal process.35 Lacey is uniquely 
positioned, as it brings to light the polymorphous tension that exists between 
the symbolic differences of statutes, their fantasmatic construal and the 
fantasmatically sustained reality of the common law.  
This tripartite tension creates a point of difference between the opinion 
of the majority of French CJ, Gummow J, Hayne J, Crennan J, Kiefel J and 
Bell J and the dissenting opinion of Heydon J. This difference centres not 
only on points of law but also on the principles of statutory interpretation as 
they were applied by the majority in Lacey in direct response to the 
jurisdiction of the appellate court and the powers of the Attorney-General of 
Queensland. This pivoting point also raises the spectre of anarchy on several 
connected fronts: the reconstruction of history by the majority when they 
examine what the law was before the statutory remedy of the Court of 
Appeal was invented in English law; what dangers lie in wait for the 
Attorney-General’s collapsed jurisdiction and powers as perceived by the 
High Court; the tension between the fantasmatic support of the presumptions 
of statutory interpretation by the majority and Heydon J’s dissenting 
judgment; and the elision of the question of anarchy by the evaporation of 
jurisdiction and power from the vantage of Heydon J. 
The artifice of legal fictions that sustain the reality of law, even in its 
history, are present in the decision of the majority in Lacey: ‘an appeal is not 
a common law remedy. It requires the creation by statute of an appellate 
jurisdiction and the powers necessary for its exercise.’36 The historical 
narrative delivered by the majority of the High Court expounds the 
development of the English Court of Appeal at some length at the outset of 
their judgment. This recounting of the legal history of the Court of Appeal 
reconstructs the law to emphasise not only Australia’s legal inheritance but 
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also the inheritance of a legal purpose, and therein signals not only an 
imparting of signifiers of the law but also their signified meaning: 
There was, at common law, no jurisdiction to entertain appeals by 
convicted persons or by the Crown against conviction or sentence. In 
1892, the Council of Judges of the Supreme Court of England and 
Wales recommended to the Lord Chancellor that a Court of Criminal 
Appeal be established with jurisdiction to entertain appeals against 
sentence and to assist the Home Secretary, at his request, in 
reconsidering sentences or convictions … The legislature did not act 
on that proposal … It was not until 1988 that the Attorney-General 
was empowered to apply to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
for leave to refer a case to it for undue leniency in sentencing.37 
The retelling of the historical manifestation of the Court of Appeal 
provides a basis for the majority’s subsequent rendering of a verdict in Lacey. 
That is to say, the way in which the purpose of the Court of Appeal is signified 
in the chain of signification creates a view of legal temporality, a past that is 
not anarchic but instead is undergoing constant ordering. The original intention 
of the Council of Judges thus becomes the measure for the contemporary state 
of affairs in the High Court of Australia and the Court of Appeal in the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, where it is possible for both the convicted 
felon and the Crown to appeal. In critical terms, the reconstruction or retelling 
of the legal history of the Court of Appeal shows the majority installing the 
order of law through a retroactive logic that consequently posits the 
contemporary appeal process through its deferral to an earlier purpose.  
It is a critical issue that once we are within law, such a reconstruction of 
legal history operates to identify a gap in the law where the history of law 
stands outside the law but simultaneously works to associate this historical 
moment with the politic of the law in the present. This reinforces the 
previous point that once we are within the chain of signification, within the 
law, we cannot commit a transcendental suspension of the law to get to some 
hypothetical beyond of law. Rather, because a subject is constituted in the 
symbolic space of signification, they will always-already be entwined with 
this existing symbolic framework. The reasoning of the High Court envelops 
the legal history being recounted within the present arrangement of law 
precisely because not to do so would make the law incoherent and expose 
the law to a kind of non-sense that is intrinsically ‘legal’ because it is only 
concerned with the decay of the fantasmatic associations that give law 
meaning. 
This concern with the decay of fantasy in its psychoanalytic sense as 
the artifice of the symbolic order is a central concern of the outcome of 
Lacey. The problem that is decided in Lacey is the legality of the Attorney-
General’s appeal to enliven a sentence in the absence of an error by the 
sentencing judge. Allowing the Attorney-General to alter sentencing because 
of a desire to exercise the provisional right to appeal mistakes the signifiers 
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of the law for the symbolic differences that maintain the ordering of the 
law’s symbolic universe. Put simply, the majority note how the legislation 
securing the Attorney-General’s provision to appeal is couched in a legal 
historical narrative that establishes a minimal difference between the writ of 
statute and the interpretation of the provision. This suggests that, rather than 
favouring the signifiers in their barest, technical form, the majority in Lacey 
prefer maintaining fantasy in parallel with reality rather than in a hierarchical 
orientation of dominance. 
This lateral parallel of statutory fantasy and legal reality is further 
queried by the unfettering of discretion expressly demanded by section 669A 
of the Criminal Code (Qld) that provides the Attorney-General with the 
provision to appeal a sentence. The majority argue that this provision is a 
matter of discretionary power arising from a procedure that is seen to be in 
tension with the stated purpose of the Court of Appeal and the Attorney-
General’s express statutory power to launch an appeal in the Court. Here, the 
signifiers of legislation appear to be at odds with the desire that is expressly 
stated in by the Minister for Justice’s Second Reading Speech:  
The Bill is being amended to make it clear that the Court of Criminal 
Appeal has an unfettered discretion to determine the proper sentence 
to impose when the Attorney-General has appealed against the 
inadequacy of the sentence.38 
While the minister’s speech identifies the intention of Parliament, it 
also elides the necessity of an erroneous construction or improper 
deployment of principle by a sentencing judge to give grounds for appeal as 
distinct from the express function of appeals by the Crown: 
The Attorney-General may appeal to the Court against any sentence 
pronounced by: 
(a) the court of trial; 
(b) a court of summary jurisdiction in a case where an indictable 
offence is dealt with summarily by that court, and the Court 
may in its unfettered discretion vary the sentence and impose 
such sentence as to the Court seems proper.39 
The majority herein identify an oblique figuring of section 669A(1), 
where the wording of the statute is too restricted to oblige the Attorney-
General of the power to enliven a sentence – or, more strongly, to even 
entertain the possibility of enlivening a sentence a priori to the appeal 
process because the conditions of the jurisdiction forbid it in their express 
statutory construction. What is rejected by the majority here is the decay of 
the fantasy sustaining symbolic reality. Specifically, the majority reject what 
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they view as a collapse of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and the 
powers of the Attorney-General.40 
The decision of the Court of Appeal to enliven Mr Lacey’s sentence at 
the suggestion of the Attorney-General thus opens up a problem of how to 
approach the meaningfulness of the signifiers of legislation. This problem 
centres on how one is to construe the express wording of section 669A(1). 
Responding to this dispute, the majority turn to the Acts Interpretation Act 
1954 (Qld) – apparently neglected by the Court of Appeal – and how the Act 
ought expressly to have guided its construal of section 669A(1). It is curious 
that this forms a bone of contention between the dissenting Heydon J and the 
majority as the majority favour extrinsic materials to resolve any possible 
ambiguity41 and provide a consistent construction, whereas Heydon J, as we 
shall see, is disenchanted with the way that the purposive inclusion of such 
extrinsic material leads away from the clear and precise language of the 
statutes, both the Criminal Code (Qld) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. 
The purposive approach of the majority in Lacey reads a unifying thread 
through the legal history of the Court of Appeal and the facility of the 
Attorney-General, as a representative of the Crown, to appeal a sentence and 
the legislative history of section 669A. This purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation invites and deploys cognate legislation throughout the decision, 
namely the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, which is buttressed by the legal 
history of the Court of Appeal offered at the outset of the majority’s decision. 
The legislative history of section 669A is used to define, limit and construe a 
purpose upon the Court of Appeal, the Criminal Code (Qld) and the powers of 
the Attorney-General. Yet the legal and legislative histories and the ratio 
decidendi indicate certain assumptions regarding the intended audience of the 
statutory enactment of the Court of Appeal, section 669A and the Attorney-
General: the audience is the judiciary rather than the executive or the 
legislature, distancing the majority’s construal from political readings. 
The purposive construction of the majority shows a tendency to read 
down the ‘unfettered discretion’ conferred upon the Court of Appeal by the 
statute. This reading down operates by linking the relevance of section 669A 
to the jurisdiction that gives the Attorney-General the power to appeal, rather 
than placing section 669A ahead of the statutory origin of the Court of Appeal. 
In a general non-legal sense, the majority here construes the decision of the 
Court of Appeal as always being fettered by the constraints of the law. But 
within the juridico-legal framework within which the court operates, this 
fettering specifically pertains to judicial discretion rather than the possibility of 
ratio decidendi made in a preceding judgment somehow conditioning the final 
decision of a case at hand a priori. The majority elaborate the view that 
possible ratio decidendi made in a preceding judgment to an appeal case ought 
to be seen as part of the act of judicial discretion, or even after the fact of the 
judicial discretion as such, a posteriori.42 
                                                           
40  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 588. 
41  The problem of construal is manifest due to the inclusion of the Minister’s speech. 
42  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 601-602. 
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The collapse of jurisdiction and power in Lacey is born of the Attorney-
General’s insistence on a construction of section 669A that, in the view of 
the majority, gives no ‘jurisdictional content to the term “appeal”’.43 But 
what are the dangers that lie in wait for such a collapse of jurisdiction and 
power as perceived by the High Court majority? Here it may be instructive 
to understanding the dilemma counter-intuitively. 
Naïvely, we can assume that all law that exists has some substantial 
content to it, a legal meaning or purpose and so forth. As noted early on in 
this discussion, such meanings are sustained by symbolic differences: the 
law as it is composed by different elements that are all unlike each other but 
that seem to circulate and function according to an order that no one element 
of law can be unto itself. These associations are fictions in the strict 
psychoanalytic sense that they stage an objective fantasy that operates 
independently of the human subjects who encounter the law but can only be 
accessed through the imaginative symbolic capacity of legal subjects. The 
law is thus not humanistic but rather radically anti-humanitistic: it does not 
negate the humanity of legal subjects so much as such humanity will only 
matter to the law if it can be ‘named’ by a signifier common to its 
signification as law. This naming does not describe anything, but instead 
delineates what is named from other elements in the symbolic network of 
legal meanings and legal fictions. The concern of the High Court is that this 
symbolic difference that separates jurisdiction from power is lost. In an 
appeal process, this is intensely problematic as it voids the different 
interpretative capacities and purposes of Courts of Appeal and the High 
Court. Here, the principles binding the sentencing judge become the only 
constraints upon the courts, inviting a type of anarchy insofar as it removes 
the distinction between the original and appellate jurisdictions where the 
subject matter of a jurisdiction ‘must be discernible from some source’.44 
The key point of difference for dissenting Justice Heydon is how to 
approach statutory interpretation in its fantasmatic entanglement. Heydon J’s 
more literalist and traditional approach to the writ of statute highlights the 
problematic judicial creativity that underlies the elegant reasoning of the 
majority.45 Heydon J’s critical reproach to the decision of the majority gives 
grounds for His Honour to claim that the appellant’s appeal is artificial.46 But 
what can this dissenting (symbolic) difference also tell us about anarchy and 
the desire for law? 
The juxtaposition of law and anarchy as ‘no law’ rests on Heydon J’s 
insistence on the ‘natural construction’47 of terms supposed to be ambiguous 
by both the appellant and the majority, such as unfettered discretion. Natural 
construction is, however, problematic for a view of law as an artifice. For 
Heydon J’s jurisprudence, natural construction supposedly overcomes the 
                                                           
43  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 588. 
44  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 588. 
45  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 595. 
46  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 596. 
47  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 596. 
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symbolic differences that enable legal language. Yet such supposedly natural 
constructions are a literalist, Ursprung approach to the logic of the provision 
of section 669A, yet at the same time avowedly appeal to the symbolic 
differences maintained by the commons, whom such plain language is 
supposed to also benefit. Heydon J’s vantage from within the law, with 
knowledge of the law, clearly delineates the possibilities present in his 
interpretation as against those who have no specialist legal knowledge or 
training, the commons. The salient psychoanalytic point at play here is an 
epistemological one: once you know the law, you cannot go back to a time 
‘before’ law – that is, natural language devoid of any reframing by legal 
discourses – because the perspective one has on the law is part of the law 
itself. This emphasises the technical nature of legal discourse, its emphasis 
on mastering the legal craft that seems to be lost on the all too technical 
approach of the literalist Heydon J. 
The judicial process under appeal comes in two parts vis-à-vis the 
possibility of fettering judicial discretion for Heydon J. The first part, says 
Heydon J, ‘is to decide whether it is open to the Court to consider varying 
the sentence at all’.48 Heydon J states that if an error of judgement is found at 
this stage, then the matter proceeds to the second part: ‘to what extent should 
the sentence be varied?’49 Heydon J surmises that the discretions of each 
stage are connected, and therefore discretions that exist in the later stage and 
not at the first are not unfettered.50 It may be suggested that Heydon J 
dismisses the appeal because the appellant’s case erroneously excludes the 
expression of the Criminal Code (Qld) as part of a legal discourse, 
emphasising a purposive construal that is favoured by the majority rather 
than dealing with what is literally worded in the Act itself. This is a curious, 
critical point for Lacey because it highlights the difficult position of the 
dissenter as at once between both the matter before the court and the 
remainder of the court itself. But more than this, the division between 
Heydon J and the majority reveals a tension between the fantasmatic support 
of the presumptions of statutory interpretation by the majority and Heydon 
J’s dissenting judgment. 
The tension between the majority and Heydon J is a symbolic one. 
Restricted merely to the technicalities of jurisprudence and statutory 
construction, we might suggest that the difference is merely one of purposive 
against literalist construal. But let us ask a naïve question here: in what 
element or part of purposive or literalist statutory interpretation and 
construction do I find this purpose or literature? The answer is clearly the 
law itself. Yet this law appears to be separate from the judge’s consciousness 
and judicial discretion, and therein beyond the rationality and reasoning that 
we may call purposive or literal.  
While the presumptions of statutory interpretation may come to bear on 
all the judges presiding in the High Court during Lacey, the critical matter of 
                                                           
48  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 592. 
49  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 592–93. 
50  Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland (2011) 242 CLR 573 at 596. 
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note is that the access to the law itself is barred or veiled by these 
presumptions: statute operates as the object-cause of the desire for statutory 
interpretation. The elaboration of Heydon J and the majority’s differing 
approaches to statutory interpretation highlights different entry points into 
the chain of the law’s signification. If the presumptions of statutory 
interpretation were suspended somehow, their fantasmatic coordination of 
reality for the subject of law would crumble. The point is that both the 
purposive and literal approaches commit to a certain objective existence of 
the law in its fantasmatic – that is, interpretable or symbolic – aspect. The 
tension between the majority and Heydon J is thus a difference of how to 
approach fantasy.  
In a literal way, Heydon J constructs a clinical and technical analysis of 
the law that plays the game of the signifier by staging the desire for the law. 
This staging of desire is the desire for law, but it is fantasmatically 
elaborated by the legal fictions of natural language, as if the law is talking to 
us and it is our choice whether or not to listen. In the purposive way, the 
majority’s construction devolves the law from the status of an Other that has 
unknowable desires to that of a small ‘o’ other, an alter-ego that has 
purposes and desires that can be assumed.51 While the literal position may 
function as a formalist interpretation of law to the letter, it remains unable to 
answer the question of what the law wants. Hence the law itself is 
fantasmatic, objectively capable of taking care of itself. The purposive 
approach compositely veers instead towards treating the law as though it 
knows what this other wants. Where Heydon J stages the desire for law, the 
purposive majority know the desire of law, but at the price of law becoming 
a diffuse symbolic socio-political mass. The majority are thus more 
‘postmodern’52: the Other is shot through with enjoyment, the law is an all-
too-human, almost fleshy mass of real people, real bodies and real things.53 
To rephrase this difference in the terms of some psychoanalytic tropes: 
Heydon J’s construction figures as that of an obsessive neurotic who enjoys 
in the structure of the law, but only insofar as it is an artifice or structure 
rather than a living thing. Conversely, the majority’s construction figures as 
that of the paranoid psychotic who knows the Other knows too that the law 
enjoys a life beyond what it says in its writ – that is, the intention of 
parliament, mischief that the statute is intended to remedy, and so on; it is an 
alter-ego or small ‘o’ other to compete with rather than a symbolic fiction to 
interpret.54 
While the above offers some insights into the desire for law and 
interpreting statutes, what might this tell us of law’s relationship to anarchy? 
                                                           
51  Žižek (2008), p 35. 
52  Emphasis is here used to highlight that these bodies are the other side of the ‘official’ 
language of postmodern jurisprudence’s emphasis on plural representation and 
interpretation as discussed by Murphy (1991). These bodies are closer to the emphasis of 
psychoanalysis and postmodern feminisms discussed by Patterson (1992). 
53  Žižek (1999), p 219 
54  Goodrich and Carlson (1998), p 6. 
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In the case of Lacey, this relation is figured in a very particular way. The 
demands of statutory interpretation and judicial construction play out in two 
apparent ways for anarchy’s relation to law in Lacey: either we may follow 
Heydon J and productively obsess over the technical expression of the law, 
ideologically coded as ‘natural language’ as though what is ‘natural’ is 
eternal and unchanging – thus anarchy is what is persistently deferred 
through a constant return of law’s signifiers; or we may follow the 
hermeneutic reasoning of the majority that is potentially endless and visceral 
insofar as the dead letter of the law comes alive with purpose and therein 
desires something from us all. In the latter, anarchy is not outside the law as 
it is in Heydon J’s construction. Instead, anarchy is constitutive of the legal 
order itself; the law is ‘mad’, more than the law alone or in itself, out of its 
‘legal’ mind and instead in a plurality of para-legal or extra-legal voices. 
Here what the law frames as ‘order’ is in fact yet another species of 
‘disorder’ claiming to be the Order. These approaches to anarchy are not 
extraneous to the previous discussion, but instead are part of the elaboration 
of their approaches to the law. 
Yet are the majority and dissenting judgments in Lacey so different? 
Can we view them instead as two sides of the same fantasmatic legal coin 
since they both clearly emphasise the law as a thesis, a starting point that 
installs an order of meaning. If the law is a thesis, from what is it 
differentiated? How might anarchy function as its antithesis? Given the 
arguments elaborated above, it may appear that anarchy returns to the law 
not as an organised movement but rather as an indivisible remainder that 
lingers on in the wake of synthesis of the purpose of law and the structure of 
law. Anarchy is an interminable symptom of the legal frame in Lacey. 
The case of Lacey is instructive in showing that the position of the law 
is not merely expressed across statute, case law and common law stare 
decisis, but is also posited as thinkable in very particular ways. The majority 
and the dissenter in Lacey highlight two possible approaches to law’s thetic 
positing. The first is the construal of the majority wherein law is a quilting of 
substantial legal and para-legal fragments that function as a type of 
normalised disorder or anarchy that is given normative value by the quilting 
of purpose that is, in strict clinical terms, a ‘delusional metaphor’ for what 
the law is and does.55 The second view of law is that of the dissenter, 
Heydon J, whose judgment differs in terms of its basis, outcome and 
approach to law as such. In what we might term a kind of jurisprudential 
modernism, Heydon J’s literalist approach to law in Lacey rejects para-legal 
materials or metaphors of purpose in favour of what is literally ‘there’ in the 
formal writ of the law itself. Heydon J’s fidelity to the law as signifier 
maintains the Otherness of the law that prohibits disorder or anarchy 
entirely; anarchy is out of the question, unthinkable – there is only the law 
and what the law says. In both instances, what can be ascertained is a certain 
psychic economy of access to the law. 
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If the law is thus posited as either normalised anarchy or the symbolic 
order, what does this tell us about its relation to anarchy? In its vulgar 
definition as the absence of order or a type of mayhem, anarchy stands out as 
an antithetical negation of both positions discussed thus far. For the 
purposive construal of the majority, anarchic mayhem is a mischief against 
which the law protects by incarnating powers, jurisdictions and the 
difference between the two: power comes from jurisdictions; jurisdictions 
come from the purpose of having law. Anarchy is everything that does not 
inhere to this delusional order. Conversely, for the more literal reasoning of 
the dissenter, anarchic mayhem is a diffuse phenomenon among many 
phenomena that occur outside the law. The law operates to protect us from 
this dark continent of grotesque things that obey no law. In its stronger 
definition, anarchy is the rejection of law. This emphasises the thrust of 
anarchy as the antithesis of law, it is law’s negation but it is also ultimately 
without substance in the absence of a legal order to reject. Thus the law must 
always tarry with its negation by anarchy insofar as it is a remainder of law 
that stands for what law is not. 
The constant mediation and negotiation of anarchy by the law is perhaps 
only possible insofar as the law exhibits a reflective dimension that makes it 
aware of its conditions and limits. What is curious is how the postmodern logic 
of purposive construal such as that of the majority in Lacey elaborates a 
synthesis of anarchy. Synthetically, the law is generated by its negation of 
anarchy through attending to some purpose. Here, the law retroactively posits 
anarchy as some mischief to be remedied by something that is avowedly part 
of this anarchic pre-legal space. The law is thus to be read as a normalised 
disorder, a type of ‘pre-order’ that attempts to regulate all other disorders; a 
radical anarchy as the rule. Yet if we take the argument that anarchy is 
precisely what the law is not, even in its radical anarchic mode, where does 
this leave the distinction between what is legal and para-legal? 
The dialectic of law and anarchy elaborated above appears to be 
deployed by the majority’s construction in Lacey. It does not, however, 
assist the literalist reasoning of Heydon J that is instead mired in the 
elaboration of endless differentiation, endless negations of what is and is not 
in the law. What changes between the vantage of Heydon J and the majority 
is not the law but rather the perspective on the law – how the law is 
apprehended by and involves the nomological psyche of the judge or other 
legal subject. 
For law to function as a synthetic construct, the anarchy that is 
normalised as legal order must lose its anarchic tinge. It does this through the 
well-known arbitrary gesture of enforcing its order with negotiations that will 
always have an end-point. Arbitration and construction offer an important 
glimpse of the negation of anarchy by law disappearing from view: we all 
know there is law and that which is not law, but the point is that when we talk 
about the law, this mediation between the legal and the para-legal vanishes. 
This vanishing is not an elision in the same way that Heydon J’s reasoning 
portrays the law as endless negations of the anarchic thing-without-law to be 
346 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2012) VOL 21 NO 2 
constantly arranged and specified; rather, the reasoning of the majority in 
Lacey presents an extremely different view of the law with a purpose. 
In proper dialectical fashion, then, it must be asked what negates this 
new thesis of law as construed by the majority in Lacey? Where exactly is 
anarchy in this arrangement, and what are the negations that operate as 
invitations to anarchy therein? The first point to which to return is that the 
law here is a normalised anarchy. This effectively means that any approach 
to anarchy in other than its normalised form as the law is not beyond the 
borders of the law but at its very core. If anarchy is not the law, 
incomprehensible to the law, but is at the same time part of the law, it is 
otherwise to be known as a symptom of the law. As verified by the 
majority’s purposive construal in Lacey, anarchy today is a symptom of the 
law. The task of law is thus to enjoy in this symptom in a legal way, to give 
it legal meaning and legal definition, to make socio-legal sense of it. 
Demands for anarchy as no law are thus thoroughly legal demands 
insofar as they reinstate the order of law by inviting its negation. Calls for 
anarchy in this way are not absolutely free in the sense of philosophical 
idealism, but are instead tyrannies to yet another universal legal ordering. 
This is the modern twist to the dialectic of the law: once you know the 
dialectical form of law, you cannot go back. 
From the above, it is supposed that anarchy today must handle a 
fundamental epistemological problem: once you know the law, you cannot 
erase it. There is no meta-language for anarchy theorists to rely upon in the 
postmodern jurisprudence of the Australian High Court majority in Lacey. 
The species of anarchy that is ruled by the market is of a species of anarchist 
thought that fits with a modern rather than postmodern frame. The useful 
psychoanalytic insight here is that the law is all too capable of disrupting 
itself as though its order is in fact a disorder. In the important precedent set 
by Project Blue Sky,56 the High Court identified that the legal subject must 
work towards establishing legislative harmony. The same can be said of the 
finding in Lacey insofar as what the majority’s judicial reasoning is really 
chasing down is the purpose or desire for law.  
This is an admittedly speculative critique of the law, but it is at the 
same time an important avenue to explore because it renders visible a range 
of complex structural issues for modern legal knowledge. Anarchy in the 
present is not outside the law. Radically normalised, anarchy is ‘the law’ and 
the repression that forgets this in Heydon J’s modern literalist construal in 
Lacey risks repressing this traumatic encounter with disorder at the heart of 
the modern Australian legal system. 
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